Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication in a Post-Concepcion Era by Gilles, Myriam
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 56 
Number 4 Justice Systems Circa 2011: Public 
Courts, Military Commissions and Aggregate 
Processing (Summer 2012) 
Article 9 
2012 
Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication in a Post-
Concepcion Era 
Myriam Gilles 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, gilles@yu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication in a Post-Concepcion Era, 56 St. Louis U. 
L.J. (2012). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol56/iss4/9 
This Childress Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
1203 
PROCEDURE IN ECLIPSE: 
GROUP-BASED ADJUDICATION IN A POST-CONCEPCION ERA 
MYRIAM GILLES* 
“[L]et me be clear that while I believe Due Process Procedure to be in 
eclipse, it is surely not dead.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Running through Professor Judith Resnik’s body of work is a deep and 
abiding interest in and exploration of the significance of real-life lawyers and 
judges in the civil justice system—their shared responsibility to discover, 
conceptualize, evaluate, frame, consolidate, monitor, negotiate, adjudicate, and 
decide complex cases.  This theme is a constant in her recent book, 
Representing Justice, co-written with Dennis Curtis,2 which brings together 
many strands of Professor Resnik’s long and illustrious academic and legal 
career. 
Representing Justice chronicles the changing nature of adjudication in the 
twentieth century.  In classic Resnikian terms, our uniquely American form of 
adjudication envisions courts “in conversation . . . with the citizenry about the 
normative” content of law.3  In this vision, open adjudicatory processes are 
themselves a foundation of democracy—legitimating government power and 
allowing the public a lens into the way law functions.4  Mapping the rise and 
 
* Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School.  I would like to thank Judith Resnik, Dennis Curtis, the 
organizers of the 2011 Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture at Saint Louis University School of 
Law, and my co-presenters and panelists.  This Article draws significantly from a recent paper I 
co-wrote with Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012). 
 1. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 624 (2005) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Procedure]. 
 2. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, 
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011). 
 3. Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the 
Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 306 (1996) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals]. 
 4. Id. at 382 (“What courts offer . . . are opportunities for public participation, for 
transformative exchanges about, as well as reaffirmation of, social and moral values.”); id. at 306 
(we “aspire[] to a court system in conversation with litigants and with the citizenry about the 
normative context in which we live and its practical import.  Courts are celebrated because their 
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fall of this adjudicatory model against a background evolution in architecture 
and visual representations of law and justice, Professors Resnik and Curtis 
teach us that, as the law granted more individuals legal personhood and the 
concomitant ability to have their grievances aired in open court through 
transparent and fair procedural rules, a strain was put on judges, on procedure, 
on the provision of justice itself.5  And this strain led judges and policymakers 
to embrace dilutive and destructive versions of the original conception of open 
adjudication.6 
Professor Resnik’s managerial judge therefore portrays a willingness to 
prioritize settlement over hearing both sides;7 on managing the process rather 
than providing due process;8 on promoting and legitimating “alternatives” to 
open adjudication—alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), mediation, private 
arbitration.9 
So by the close of the twentieth century, Professors Resnik and Curtis 
chronicle, the celebrated and uniquely American model of providing publicly-
subsidized, broadly-available means of adjudicating disputes was in sharp 
decline, along with other public institutions once regarded as vital to 
disseminating knowledge about the government—such as the press and post 
office.10 
 
processes have the capacity to dignify and respect individuals’ entitlements to voice and 
efficacy.”); see also Courtroom Use: Access to Justice, Effective Judicial Administration, and 
Courtroom Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 84 (2010) (statement of Judith Resnik) (“[P]ublic 
adjudicatory procedures make important contributions to functioning democracies.”); Judith 
Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405, 419–20 (1987) [hereinafter 
Resnik, A Public Dimension]; Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. 
Concepcion, Wal-mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 82–83 (2011) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Fairness in Numbers] (asserting that “public processes” are an important 
facet of “due process norms—the obligation to open adjudicatory processes to third parties, so as 
to illuminate and monitor the other facets of the process ‘due’ and, in democratic orders, to 
legitimate the binding power of the judgments made”). 
 5. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 306–10. 
 6. See Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of 
Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 199–200 (2003) [hereinafter Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss] 
(arguing that the last century has seen the triumph of adjudication but also its demise, through 
growth of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) and administrative process, and that 
“[a]djudication’s supporters need to return to their claims for adjudication and ask how 
adjudication can be refashioned to deliver its promises more broadly”). 
 7. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–77 (1982). 
 8. Id. at 425–26, 430. 
 9. See Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss, supra note 6, at 188 (explaining that by the end of the 
twentieth century, federal judges had embraced alternatives to adjudication, such as arbitration, to 
allow the parties to resolve their disputes at a lower cost). 
 10. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 304–07. 
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Nowhere has this strain on, and resultant abandonment of, the adjudicatory 
ideal been more acutely felt than in the world of class actions.  In many ways, 
class actions and aggregate litigation represent the law’s best-effort at 
procedural democracy, at providing access to courts for groups—consumers, 
employees, small business owners—that would otherwise be unable to have 
their claims openly adjudicated.11  But the story of class actions mirrors in 
many ways the narrative of adjudication that Professors Resnik and Curtis 
trace more generally: from the adoption of the 1966 class action rule12 forward, 
as more class actions were certified,13 more strain was put on judges to manage 
quite ungainly processes.  Critiques of the class action became increasingly 
sharp.  Foremost was the assertion that the agency costs inherent in 
representative litigation were too high, giving class action lawyers tremendous 
and nearly unfettered power to extract massive settlements from risk-averse 
corporations.14  Other accounts stressed the due process and autonomy-based 
concerns of voice, exit, and opportunity of class members to actively engage in 
group-based adjudication.15  Taken together, these critiques severely 
challenged courts in ways that parallel the Resnik and Curtis account of 
adjudication more broadly. 
 
 11. Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals, supra note 3, at 299 (“[O]ne of the primary 
purposes of class actions is to enable groups otherwise without legal representation to obtain 
access to courts; the group creates sufficiently large economic or social interests to attract 
attorney attention and entrepreneurial risk-taking.”); see also Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra 
note 4, at 84 (describing the class action rule as providing “consumers claiming statutory rights 
the capacity to attract lawyers through the potential for large monetary recoveries”). 
 12. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (amended 1966). 
 13. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1344–45 (1995) (explaining that by the end of the 1980s, class actions 
were increasingly certified). 
 14. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs 
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 103, 156 n.199 
(2006) (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 882–83 (1987); Bruce 
Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality 
and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1402 (2000) (“Risk averse parties will pay a 
premium to avoid taking a gamble.”); Note, Risk-Preference Asymmetries in Class Action 
Litigation, 119 HARV. L. REV. 587, 600 (2005) (noting that in a “low-merit suit” the defendant’s 
risk aversion will be heightened, and a “risk-averse defendant would likely pay a high premium to 
avoid the variance of a class action trial.”)). 
 15. Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals, supra note 3, at 318 n.63, 320, 391–95; see also 
id. at 389–90 (“[I]n some class actions, class representatives [should] have to fashion means to 
ensure the delivery of legal services and procedural opportunities for individual clients. . . .  
[S]tatutes or other rules that create provisions for aggregation should acknowledge the existence 
of variation among claimants within an aggregate. . . . [J]udges [should] police those procedures 
by warning lawyers that failure to meet these obligations could be grounds for disaggregation and 
could be relevant to the payment of both costs and fees.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1206 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1203 
In general and over time, judges and legislators became increasingly 
suspicious of class actions, and sought ways to curtail access to group 
adjudication.  Courts ramped up the standards governing the certification of 
damages16 and injunctive classes,17 and created new standing requirements for 
consumer class actions.18  Congress enacted legislative reforms, such as the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act19 and the Class Action Fairness Act.20  
 
 16. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316, 320 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“An overlap between a class certification requirement and the merits of a claim is no 
reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether a class 
certification requirement is met. . . . Factual determinations necessary to make Rule 23 findings 
must be made by a preponderance of the evidence.”); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 
F.3d 24, 41–42 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting the “some showing” standard and adopting a 
requirement that plaintiffs provide definitive proof, through “affidavits, documents, or testimony, 
to . . . [establish] that each Rule 23 requirement has been met”); see also J. Douglas Richards & 
Benjamin D. Brown, Predominance of Common Questions—Common Mistakes in Applying the 
Class Action Standard, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 163, 168–69 (2009). 
 17. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556–57 (2011).  By redefining the 
hitherto easy-to-satisfy commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), the Supreme Court in Wal-
Mart made injunctive cases nearly as difficult to certify as damages cases under the 
IPO/Hydrogen Peroxide line of cases.  See id.; supra note 16. 
 18. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-
Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 310, 316 (2010) (describing the 
development of an “implicit requirement” of ascertainability, under which courts in consumer 
cases have refused to certify classes in the absence of “reliable proof of purchase or a knowable 
list of injured plaintiffs” and asserting that this new standing requirement dooms many consumer 
class actions arising from small retail purchases because consumers are unlikely to retain the 
proof of purchase necessary to satisfy ascertainability); see also In re Teflon Prods. Liab. Litig., 
254 F.R.D. 354, 357, 365, 371 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (denying certification and asserting that “where 
claims turn on individual facts . . . the typicality requirement cannot be met” in a products 
liability suit where plaintiffs had purchased cookware coated with Teflon); In re Conagra Peanut 
Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 691, 699 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (denying class certification 
to  a group of plaintiffs who purchased contaminated peanut butter, and asserting that “the 
governing law requires individual proof of damages”); In re Fresh Del Monte Pineapples 
Antitrust Litig., No. 1:04-md-1628 (RMB), 2008 WL 5661873, at *3, *5, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 
2008) (denying certification to the “Indirect Purchaser Class” of pineapples in part due to these 
plaintiffs’ failure to retain and present “proof of purchases made during the Class period”); In re 
Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 614, 617–18 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (“Here, 
individuals would be required to show some proof of injury—in this case purchase and 
possession of a non-expired PPA-containing product . . . .  The court doubts that many individuals 
will still have records of minor purchases such as these products dating back to the fall of 
2000.”). 
 19. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).  This Act provides that the lead 
plaintiff—the class member with the largest claimed loss who seeks the position, 15 U.S.C. § 
77z-1 (a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006)—shall “select and retain counsel to represent the class.”  15 
U.S.C. § 77z (a)(3)(B)(v).  The PSLRA “transformed the lead plaintiff process from a ‘race to the 
courthouse’ to an orderly procedure.”  David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] PROCEDURE IN ECLIPSE 1207 
Taken together, these “reforms” have had the overall and generally intended 
effect of pushing litigants towards non-collective, non-adjudicatory remedies.21 
Yet, throughout these decades of arguing about and seeking means to 
reform class actions and aggregate litigation, Rule 23’s procedures22 remained 
viable and accessible, representing both the great promise and the significant 
problems of the Resnikian adjudicatory model.23  At the very least, these 
procedural devices remained generally viable until the Supreme Court’s April 
2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, finding state-law rules 
invalidating class action waivers on unconscionability grounds preempted by 
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).24 
So while Professor Resnik wrote the epigraph cited above just seven years 
ago—expressing her belief that procedural due process was not dead, but 
merely “in eclipse”25—the decision in Concepcion challenges this view with 
regard to aggregate litigation.  The decision to uphold class waivers and 
disallow the aggregation of legal claims is a direct rejection of the Resnikian 
adjudicatory model that seeks to provide “opportunities for public 
 
Pension Fund Activism In Securities Class Actions?  An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 
2038 (2010). 
 20. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.).  CAFA expands federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions to include 
any case with more than 100 plaintiffs and $5 million in controversy.  Class Action Fairness Act 
of 2005 § 4 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2)(A), 1332(d)(5)(B)); see also EMERY 
G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION 
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2008), available at http://www.us 
courts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Fourth%20Interim%20Report%20Class%20Ac 
tion.pdf (reporting an increase in number of removals to federal court immediately after CAFA 
was enacted, followed by a flattening to pre-CAFA levels). 
 21. There are some indications that net class action filings have remained consistent over the 
past three years.  See, e.g., FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P., 7TH ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS 
SURVEY FINDINGS 19 (2010), available at http://www.fulbright.com/litigationtrends.  Given the 
increased evidentiary and burden-of-proof standards that plaintiffs must satisfy, a significant 
number of these classes are not certified.  See Joel S. Feldman, Simone Cruickshank & Gary 
McGinnis, Evidentiary and Burden of Proof Standards for Class Certification Rulings, 11 CLASS 
ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA), June 11, 2010, at 536, 536, 539.  Securities fraud class actions 
appear to be the exception.  See, e.g., JORDAN MILEV, ROBERT PATTON & SVETLANA STARYKH, 
NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS: 2011 MID-
YEAR REVIEW 1 (2011) (reporting that securities class action filings remained steady in the first 
half of 2011 and suggesting that “a wave of new cases alleging breach of fiduciary duty in 
connection with mergers and acquisitions” is the cause). 
 22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 23. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the Resnikian adjudicatory model). 
 24. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 25. Resnik, Procedure, supra note 1, at 624. 
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participation.”26  Rather, on this new vision of non-adjudication, the legal 
claims of consumers, employees and others (to the extent they can be brought 
at all) occur in private one-on-one arbitration rather than the public, 
participatory forum of a courtroom.27  In this brave new world, judges are 
disabled from adjudicating claims involving broadly inflicted harms, and 
private lawyers are no longer incentivized to ferret out mass wrongs and to 
litigate small claims.  So irrespective of whether one buys into the Posnerian 
critiques about the over-empowerment of class action plaintiffs,28 or the 
Resnikian concern with “[g]roup litigation [as] basically belong[ing] to judges, 
special masters, and lawyers—talking only with each other and making 
decisions about categories of claims”29 the debate is now moot.  Suddenly, 
defendants hold the power to avoid aggregate dispute resolution through the 
simple expedient of including boilerplate waivers in their standard form 
contracts.30 
This is the world in which we find ourselves in the aftermath of 
Concepcion.  Newly validated by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, class 
action waivers will soon seep into every contract31—whether signed, clicked, 
mass-emailed, posted on a website, or otherwise “consented to”—until 
aggregate litigation itself becomes a procedural relic examined only briefly in 
courses on the legal history of the twentieth century, that long-ago era where 
legal claims were actually adjudicated in public courts of law.32  If this is an 
eclipse, it is difficult to see what will make the sun come out again. 
 
 26. See Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals, supra note 3, at 382; see also supra note 3 
and accompanying text. 
 27. See, e.g., Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4, at 87 (“Indeed, it is the 
performance of fairness before the public that legitimates adjudication.”). 
 28.  See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1294, 1297–98 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(describing “the sheer magnitude of the risk to which the class action, in contrast to . . . individual 
actions . . . exposes” defendants and worrying that such massive liability exposure will create 
“intense pressure to settle”). 
 29. Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals, supra note 3, at 399. 
 30. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753, 1755 (2011) 
(invalidating California’s Discover Bank rule, which found class-action waivers in arbitration 
agreements contained in certain consumer contracts of adhesion unconscionable). 
 31. See id. at 1743, 1753. 
 32. Indeed, a major theme of REPRESENTING JUSTICE is the changing nature of adjudication 
in the twenty-first century.  See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 306–10.  As Professor Resnik 
asserts, even as Americans built grander and grander courthouses during that century—“glorious 
new edifices to adjudication”—these houses of justice became available to fewer and fewer 
litigants—mainly wealthy, corporate, repeat players using courts as one of multiple means 
towards their desired ends.  Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 
1101, 1154 (2006) [hereinafter Resnik, Whither Adjudication?] (“[T]he large and distinguished 
new buildings of courthouses may well capture the practices of contemporary adjudication—that 
it is a luxury good, available for only a few, inhabiting sparsely populated and gracious 
buildings.”). 
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As with so many legal developments, Professor Resnik foresaw this 
general retreat from adjudication long ago and early on sounded the warning 
that broad acceptance of arbitration had given rise to a troubling body of 
contract procedure that forced most civil litigation out of open-forum courts.33  
She, who famously reproduced her actual cell phone agreement (with its 
typical class action waiver) in a 2006 article on the demise of the adjudicatory 
model, also anticipated the rise of class action waivers.34  But few could have 
predicted the breathtakingly broad decision in Concepcion, nor the shallow 
opportunities for class action litigation that remain in its wake.35 
This Article, inspired by and written in honor of Professor Resnik, seeks to 
examine the gloomy post-Concepcion landscape and to ponder the possibility 
of reshaping aggregate litigation through the offices of the states’ attorneys 
general, bringing claims on behalf of injured citizens pursuant to their parens 
patriae authority.  For Resnik, a principal value of open adjudication is the 
public’s participatory presence, which enables the electorate to “form 
independent judgments about the quality of government actions,” forcing 
information into the public realm that “becomes part of iterative exchanges 
with other branches of government” and “help[ing] to generate a new set of 
democratic norms.”36  But if courts are no longer willing and able to engage in 
this “ambitious project that put[s] government processes before the public eye 
and offer[s] access to all,”37 then we must consider whether other institutions 
of government are available to meet these needs. 
My argument, which draws heavily from other recent work,38 is that “the 
‘private attorney general’ role assumed by class action lawyers over the past 
 
 33. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
494, 539–41 (1986) [hereinafter Resnik, Failing Faith] (examining emerging hostility toward 
adjudication). 
 34. Resnik, Whither Adjudication?, supra note 32, at 1134–36 (“[B]y unwrapping the phone 
and activating the new service, I waived my rights to go to court and became obligated to 
‘arbitrate disputes arising out of or related to’ this or ‘prior agreements.’  Further, both the 
provider and I agreed to waive our rights to pursue any ‘class action or class arbitration.’”); see 
also RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 319, fig.201 (reproducing Professor Resnik’s cell phone 
contract). 
 35. Though writing back in 2006, Professor Resnik was quite pessimistic, warning that the 
“continued diminution of adjudicatory possibilities comes from the current composition of both 
the Congress and the federal judiciary, as well as the concerted campaigns to curb the use of 
courts (replete with anti-trial lawyer advertisements) by private sector actors.”  Resnik, Whither 
Adjudication?, supra note 32, at 1150. 
 36. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4, at 91–92, 168. 
 37. Id. at 168. 
 38. See generally Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the 
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012) [hereinafter Gilles & 
Friedman, After Class] (arguing that state attorneys general “have the ability to fill the void 
created by class actions . . . through expanded use of the parens patriae authority”). 
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several decades [could] give way to a world in which state attorneys general 
make broad use of their parens patriae authority . . . to represent the interests 
of their citizens” in the types of class actions that are now blocked by the 
waivers.39  This Article situates the state AGs as a second-best solution, and 
parens patriae litigation as a viable alternative to the open adjudication of 
claims.  My assertion is not that reliance on state AGs is ideal, but only that in 
the aftermath of Concepcion and the growing hostility towards broad rights-
based litigation, it may be the only viable option for group-based 
adjudication.40 
Part I sketches the legal topography of the pre- and post-Concepcion 
landscape, charting the rise of class action waivers up to the April 2011 
Supreme Court ruling, and suggesting a handful of legal challenges and 
legislative responses to waivers that remain viable today.  Part II asks whether 
viable alternatives to class actions exist in the wake of Concepcion—
specifically, whether we might look to regulatory agencies to bring claims or 
seek changes to broad-scale injurious practices, or whether individual 
arbitration of claims could realistically replace class or aggregate litigation.  
Finding these alternatives sorely lacking, Part III presents the state AGs as a 
possible savior of the wounded class action mechanism.  This final part is 
merely an outline—more muscular analysis awaits—but the general idea of 
state AGs using their parens patriae authority to bring claims on behalf of 
injured citizens seeks to leverage many of the benefits of a public adjudicatory 
system that Professors Resnik and Curtis extol: responsible public officials in 
dialogue with their community on shared issues of significance, seeking 
efficient and just means of resolving disputes and communicating normative 
aspects of law and democracy.41  In this final Part, I endeavor to gauge the 
state AG model against Resnikian standards; her views and her writings 
provide an intricate atlas that may help map our progress from this point to the 
next, post-eclipse stage of aggregate litigation. 
 
 39. See id. at 630. 
 40. See, e.g., RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 315 (describing the devolution of judicial 
authority to agencies as “a second-best response, a necessary adaptation in the face of [increasing] 
demand”). 
 41. See Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals, supra note 3, at 306. 
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I.  AT&T MOBILITY LLC V. CONCEPCION: 
THE ASCENDANCE OF CLASS ACTION WAIVERS 
The vast majority of class actions are based on some sort of contractual 
relationship, often in the form of a standard-form contract.42  This is true of 
nearly all consumer, employment, and antitrust class actions, as well as “class 
actions relating to insurance benefits, ERISA plans, mutual funds, franchise 
agreements, and an endless variety of other matters.”43  Beginning as early as 
the 1940s, companies began to insert in their contracts arbitration provisions 
requiring disputes to be arbitrated before the American Arbitration Association 
or the National Arbitration Forum, rather than litigated in courts.44  At first, 
courts were “reluctant to enforce contracts to arbitrate”: “[p]rotective of their 
special mandate, judges frowned on [these] agreements.”45  But by the 1980s, 
the Supreme Court had “reread federal statutes to permit—rather than to 
prohibit—enforcement of arbitration contracts” pursuant to the FAA.46  In the 
late 1980s and into the 1990s, the Court further “moved from accepting 
arbitration clauses to a posture of slavish deference” in a set of rulings finding 
that the FAA applies in state as well as federal court proceedings and preempts 
state legislation affecting arbitration.47  By the dawn of the twenty-first 
century, it was clear that the Supreme Court “insisted on the validity of 
contracts that put dispute resolution outside of courthouses and away from 
open and public hearings.”48 
 
 42. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005) [hereinafter Gilles, Opting Out]. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. at 396–97; see also Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals, supra note 3, at 327, 
331 (“The orientation has shifted from a focus on regulatory rights-pronouncement and individual 
litigants to an emphasis on dispute resolution, which has been facilitated by court adoption of 
settlement conferences, court-annexed arbitration, and other modes of encouraging consensual 
dispositions.”). 
 45. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 319; see also Resnik, Procedure, supra note 1, at 
619–20 (“[T]he law [has] been ambivalent about enforcing obligations to participate in private 
dispute resolution at the expense of access to public processes.  Judges guarded their own 
monopoly power and regularly refused to enforce arbitration contracts.”). 
 46. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 320; see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 478–79, 483, 486 (1989) (finding that claims under the Securities 
Act of 1933 were arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 641 (1985) (announcing a “federal policy favoring arbitration”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be 
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.”); Judith Resnik, 
Procedure’s Projects, 23 CIV. JUST. Q. 273, 289 (2004) (“Over the course of the twentieth 
century, the attitudes of legislators and court-based adjudicators [towards arbitration] changed.”). 
 47. Gilles, Opting Out, supra note 42, at 393–94 n.108; see also Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. 
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (finding that the FAA preempted a state-law requirement 
that a contract containing an arbitration clause include notification on the first page of the 
contract); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (rejecting arguments 
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Buoyed by this extraordinary judicial deference, some companies went a 
step further, inserting class action waivers in contractual arbitration provisions.  
Class action waivers work “to ensure that any claim against the corporate 
defendant may be asserted only in a one-on-one, non-aggregated arbitral 
proceeding.  More virulent strains of the clause force the would-be plaintiff to 
waive even her right to be represented as a passive, or absent, class member” 
or to finance or aid in the commencement of a class proceeding by another 
injured party.49  In short, class action waivers doom any aggregate or group 
litigation, so it isn’t at all surprising that corporate defendants with a keen 
interest in avoiding class action liability have aggressively adopted and 
defended the validity of these contractual devices.50 
The movement to insert class action waivers in consumer contracts51 
accelerated in 1999, when the National Arbitration Forum, “a for-profit arbitral 
body designated in the arbitration provisions of many large companies, 
disseminated marketing materials cautioning corporate attorneys that the only 
 
by twenty state attorneys general in finding that the FAA applies in state as well as federal court); 
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 484, 491 (1987) (holding the FAA preempted the California 
Labor Code, which authorized an action for the collection of wages “without regard to the 
existence of any private agreement to arbitrate”); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 15–
16 (1984) (holding that the FAA applies in state courts and preempting state legislation 
interpreted to protect franchisees from unfair arbitration agreements); David S. Schwartz, 
Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal 
Arbitration Act, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 5, 5 (“Despite its constant, 
talismanic repetition, the ‘national policy favoring arbitration’ is illusory and is highly dubious 
federalism.”).  Professor Resnik has compared the Class Action Fairness Act to the Supreme 
Court’s arbitration-preemption jurisprudence, writing both are “part of a cohort of enactments and 
doctrinal developments of this era that preempt state decision making and push litigants toward 
noncollective and nonadjudicative remedies such as privately sponsored arbitration programs.”  
Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class 
Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards” of Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1929, 1930 (2008). 
 48. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 320. 
 49. Gilles, Opting Out, supra note 42, at 375–76. 
 50. See, e.g., Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 51, 58 n.4 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(appealing from the district court’s order striking the class waiver and arguing for its validity 
based on “the company’s assumption of the costs of mediation and arbitration, reimbursement of 
legal costs up to $2,500 to each employee who wishes to arbitrate, the mutuality of the obligation 
to arbitrate, and the ease and speed of arbitration”); Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 
LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 882–83 (11th Cir. 2005) (appealing and obtaining a reversal of the district 
court’s finding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable); Tillman v. 
Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 373 (N.C. 2008) (“Defendants argue that finding 
this [arbitration] clause to be unconscionable would be ‘hostile to arbitration.’”). 
 51. See Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 796 
(2008) (“[The] worldwide movement toward ADR is propelled by political and social forces 
trumpeting deregulation and privatization and is staffed by lawyers and other professionals 
seeking and shaping new markets.”). 
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way to insulate their clients from class action liability . . . was to implement 
arbitration provisions containing [class action waivers].”52  Companies were 
responsive: American Express sent notices to roughly 1.5 million small-
merchant accounts providing that agreements would be deemed to include 
arbitration provisions containing express class waivers;53 cell phone and 
internet companies informed customers in monthly bill-stuffers that continued 
usage of their phones or data service plans constituted agreement to class 
action waivers;54 and waivers quickly began popping up in standard-form 
contracts with shippers,55 health clubs,56 and other ordinary goods and services 
providers.57 
A. Unconscionability Challenges circa 1999-2011 
Inevitably, some of the companies that implemented class action waivers 
found themselves as defendants in putative class actions.58  As those 
defendants asserted the waivers as a defense, plaintiffs’ lawyers looked for 
ways to challenge their enforceability.  The common law contract doctrine of 
unconscionability appeared promising:59 under the FAA, a party may oppose 
 
 52. Gilles, Opting Out, supra note 42, at 397. 
 53. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., No. 03 CV 9592(GBD), 2006 WL 662341, at *2, *9 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006). 
 54. See, e.g., Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, 
at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d, Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 
2009), rev’d, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  Note that under the 
FAA, arbitration clauses need not be signed to be enforceable.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 55. See Answer and Jury Demand of Defendant Fed. Express Corp. at 21, Moody v. Fed. 
Express Corp., No. 02 L 601 (Ill. Cir. Feb. 6, 2003) (asserting that each putative class member, all 
customers of FedEx, “agreed in their contracts with FedEx that each ‘will not sue [FedEx] as a 
class’”). 
 56. See Benjamin Sachs-Michaels, The Demise of Class Actions Will Not Be Televised, 12 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665, 667 (2011). 
 57. See, e.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1217, 1218 (11th Cir. 2007) (involving 
a contract with a cable TV provider containing a class action waiver); Shroyer v. New Cingular 
Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 978, 980, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving a contract for cell 
phone service containing a class action waiver); Fluke v. CashCall, Inc., No. 08-05776, 2009 WL 
1437593, at *1, *2 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 2009) (involving a contract with a payday lender containing 
a class action waiver); Brazil v. Dell Inc., No. C-07-01700 RMW, 2007 WL 2255296, at *1, *2 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2007) (involving an agreement for a computer purchase containing a class 
action waiver). 
 58. See supra note 57. 
 59. Basic contract law directs that a contractual provision be deemed unenforceable if it is 
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011).  Procedural unconscionability focuses on “oppression” or “surprise” due 
to unequal bargaining power, while substantive unconscionability focuses on “overly harsh” or 
“one-sided” results.  Id.; see also 6A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1376, 
at 21 (1962) (stating that standardized contracts offered to individuals on an “‘accept this or get 
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arbitration on such “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract,”60 and seventeen years ago, the Supreme Court held that 
unconscionability provides one such ground.61 
At first, courts were skeptical of these unconscionability challenges leveled 
at the class action waivers, and the vast majority of early decisions upheld the 
waivers against this challenge.62  The tide turned in 2005, when the California 
Supreme Court decided in Discover Bank v. Superior Court that “at least some 
class action waivers in consumer contracts are unconscionable under California 
law.”63  Specifically, where class action waivers “operate effectively as 
exculpatory contract clauses that are contrary to public policy,” the court held 
them invalid.64  Other state courts soon followed the Discover Bank ruling, and 
by 2011, fourteen state supreme courts had invalidated class action waivers on 
unconscionability grounds.65  By the time of the Concepcion decision in April 
2011, “the trend was unmistakable: class action waivers were being defeated in 
courts around the country.”66 
B. The Concepcion Decision 
In April 2011, a closely divided Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, rejecting the unconscionability challenge to waivers that 
had gained significant traction in the state courts over the past decade.67  The 
Concepcion case arises from facts that are fairly typical of everyday consumer 
transactions: Vincent and Liza Concepcion signed up for a two-year service 
agreement with AT&T Mobility in order to receive a “free” cell phone, but 
then learned that they had to pay $30.22 in sales tax for the putatively free 
 
nothing’ basis” are subject to vigilant judicial scrutiny to avoid enforcement of unconscionable 
provisions). 
 60. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 61. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (“[G]enerally applicable 
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate 
arbitration agreements without contravening §2 [of the FAA].”). 
 62. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance, 400 F.3d 868, 882–83 (11th Cir. 2005); 
Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 176 (5th Cir. 2004); 
Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 2003); Snowden v. CheckPoint 
Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638–39 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 63. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 64. Id. at 1105–06, 1108, 1110 (explaining that the public policy concern was founded on 
the “important role of class action remedies in California law” as “the only effective way to halt 
and redress [consumer] exploitation”). 
 65. See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 633. 
 66. Id. 
 67. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–48, 1753 (2011). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] PROCEDURE IN ECLIPSE 1215 
device.68  The Concepcions filed a class action lawsuit alleging consumer 
fraud, and AT&T moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration 
clause in its standard service agreement, which contained a class action 
waiver.69  In ruling on AT&T’s motion to compel arbitration, a reluctant 
district court felt itself duty-bound by Discover Bank to invalidate the class 
action waiver.70  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.71 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to “consider whether the FAA 
prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration 
agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures.”72  In 
arguing against preemption, the plaintiffs focused on the FAA’s saving clause, 
and asserted that the Discover Bank rule holding class action waivers 
unconscionable applies with equal force to contracts mandating arbitration or 
those banning class actions in court.73 
But a slim majority of the Supreme Court disagreed, finding California’s 
Discover Bank rule too broad to be covered by the FAA’s saving clause.74  As 
Justice Scalia wrote, “[a]lthough § 2’s saving clause preserves generally 
applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-
law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s 
objectives.”75  The majority found the categorical nature the Discover Bank 
rule posed just such an obstacle, as it essentially allows any consumer to 
demand classwide arbitration.76  As such, the Court found the state law 
unconscionability approach of California and fourteen other states preempted 
by the FAA.77 
 
 68. Id. at 1744; Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 69. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744–45. 
 70. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *14 
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d, Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), 
rev’d, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 71. Laster, 584 F.3d at 857, 859 (asserting that the Discover Bank ruling was a “refinement 
of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in California” and therefore did 
not discriminate against arbitration). 
 72. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
 73. Id. at 1746. 
 74. Id. at 1747–48, 1753. 
 75. Id. at 1748. 
 76. Id. at 1750 (“California’s Discover Bank rule . . . interferes with arbitration.  Although 
the rule does not require classwide arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to 
demand it ex post.”). 
 77. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748, 1753 (finding the Discover Bank rule fatally 
“interfere[d] with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create[d] a scheme inconsistent 
with the FAA”); see supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1216 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1203 
C. Legal and Legislative Responses to Class Action Waivers Post-
Concepcion 
In the aftermath of Concepcion, we should expect and are beginning to see 
more companies incorporating class action waivers into all sorts of consumer 
contracts.78  We should also expect that plaintiffs’ class action lawyers will 
continue (for a little while, at least) to challenge these waivers, so that courts 
will soon be forced to carefully consider the impact of the Concepcion ruling.  
The scope of the Concepcion decision therefore requires careful and critical 
analysis. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion is clear on one point: that a 
broad state law rule holding unenforceable class action waivers in consumer 
adhesion contracts will be preempted by the FAA.79  But in recent years 
plaintiffs have mounted successful challenges to class waivers on another 
theory—“that the waiver’s implicit prohibition against spreading the costs of 
litigation across multiple claimants in collective litigation precludes the 
individual plaintiff from being able to vindicate her federal statutory rights.”80  
Unlike the state law founded unconscionability challenge,81 this theory of 
unenforceability is grounded in the Supreme Court’s recognition in Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Randolph that “the existence of large arbitration costs could 
preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights 
in the arbitral forum.”82  In Randolph, the Court held that “where . . . a party 
 
 78. Jonathan Gertler & Christian Schreiber, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion: The Death 
Knell for Class Actions?, PLAINTIFF, June 2011, at 24, 28. 
 79. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748, 1750, 1753. 
 80. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 633; see also Gilles, Opting Out, supra 
note 42, at 407 (“[T]he collective action waiver[’s] . . . implicit ban on spreading across multiple 
plaintiffs the costs of experts, depositions, neutrals’ fees, and other disbursements—forces the 
individual claimant to assume financial burdens so prohibitive as to deter the bringing of claims.  
In the absence of the waiver, the claimant may spread these costs across thousands of coventurers 
(or have them advanced by lawyers, as happens in practice).  In the presence of the waiver, these 
costs fall on her alone.  And these costs, in a complex commercial case, will exceed the value of 
the recovery she is seeking.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 81. See Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 237 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting an 
“an important legal distinction between” preemption analysis, and cases where courts seek “to 
reconcile two federal statutes to ensure that one did not trench on the other, a task routinely 
performed by federal courts”); Tufariello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 458 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(internal citation omitted) (“[T]he preemption doctrine flows from the Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, which ‘invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary 
to federal law.’  The doctrine is inapplicable to a potential conflict between two federal 
statutes.”); Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 608 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[P]reemption 
does not describe the effect of one federal law upon another; it refers to the supremacy of federal 
law over state law when Congress, acting within its enumerated powers, intends one to displace 
the other.”). 
 82. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000). 
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seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration 
would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the 
likelihood of incurring such costs.”83 
Prior to Concepcion, a few circuit courts had invalidated class action 
waivers on this ground84 or recognized the validity of the analysis,85 raising the 
question of whether the vindication-of-rights theory survives the Court’s 
ruling.  In Amex III, the Second Circuit considered this exact question, ruling  
“Concepcion does not alter our analysis”86 and finding the class action waiver 
“unenforceable[] ‘because enforcement of the clause would effectively 
preclude any action seeking to vindicate the statutory rights asserted by the 
plaintiffs.’”87  The court interpreted Concepcion as limited to the question of 
“whether a state contract law is preempted by the FAA,” as distinct from the 
“vindication of statutory rights analysis, which is part of the federal substantive 
law of arbitrability.”88  The Amex III decision follows upon and affirms a 
number of post-Concepcion district court decisions—interestingly, all out of 
the Southern District of New York—finding waivers unenforceable on these 
grounds.89  But defendants have sought en banc review, and will surely petition 
 
 83. Id. at 92. 
 84. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 320 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated 
sub nom., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010); Kristian v. Comcast 
Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 55, 64 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 85. See, e.g., In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f a 
party could demonstrate that the prohibition on class actions likely would make arbitration 
prohibitively expensive, such a showing could invalidate an agreement . . . .”); Livingston v. 
Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 
531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)) (“A party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement must establish 
that the agreement precludes them from effectively ‘vindicating [their] statutory cause of action in 
the arbitral forum.’ . . .  In the present case, the [plaintiffs] have not offered any specific evidence 
of arbitration costs that they may face in this litigation, prohibitive or otherwise, and have failed 
to provide any evidence of their inability to pay such costs . . . .”).  As the Second Circuit 
remarked in Amex III, 
In each of these cases, plaintiffs’ attempts to avoid the waiver clause failed because 
plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate the class-action waivers barred them from 
vindicating their statutory rights. Their failures speak to the quality of the evidence 
presented, not the viability of the legal theory. The fact that plaintiffs so often fail in their 
attempts to overturn such waivers demonstrates that the evidentiary record necessary to 
avoid a class-action arbitration waiver is not easily assembled, and that the courts are 
capable of the scrutiny such arguments require. 
In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 217 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 86. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d at 206. 
 87. Id. (quoting In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
 88. Id. at 213. 
 89. See, e.g., Raniere v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2248, 2011 WL 5881926, at *13 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011) (“[E]ven if AT & T is read broadly to acquiesce to the enforcement of 
an arbitral agreement that as a practical matter would prevent the vindication of state rights in the 
name of furthering the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, that would not alter the validity 
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for certiorari, so until all appeals are exhausted, the viability of this theory 
remains unsettled.90 
Challenges to class action waivers based on state statutory or common law 
will likely face greater difficulty navigating the Court’s Concepcion decision.  
Recall that the Concepcion majority was concerned with state law rules 
seeking to regulate the legality of class action waivers that might “stand[] as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress” as expressed in the FAA.91  But because the majority 
is not entirely clear on just what “stands as an obstacle” means,92 it is difficult 
to predict what sorts of state statutory or common law rules might survive in 
the post-Concepcion era.  Any analysis arguably requires a case-by-case 
evaluation, wherein plaintiffs could show (for example) that the imposition of 
the class waiver confers de facto immunity on the defendant or otherwise 
violates the savings clause in case-specific, factually intensive ways.  Put 
differently, “[t]he sin of the Discover Bank rule was that it did not require the 
claimant to show that the agreement operated as an exculpatory contract on a 
case-specific basis.”93  So it may be possible for state courts post-Concepcion 
to invalidate waivers based on recognized defenses to contract on a case-by-
case basis (as opposed to California’s “categorical” rule),94 so long as any such 
effort does not discriminate against arbitration95 or have the effect of rendering 
arbitration, as traditionally defined, unavailable in some category of cases.96 
 
of the federal statutory rights analysis articulated in Mitsubishi, Green Tree [and] American 
Express . . . .”); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2011 WL 
2671813, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011) (declining to apply Concepcion where the question 
before the court involved the plaintiff’s ability to vindicate a federal statutory right); Sutherland v. 
Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 550–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding Amex I “retains its 
persuasive force” following Stolt-Nielsen). 
 90. See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief and Appendix Volume I of III at 29 n.2, Homa v. 
Am. Express Co., No. 11-3600 (3d Cir. Dec. 21, 2011) (appealing a district court’s enforcement 
of an arbitration agreement in light of Concepcion and preserving for en banc review the issue of 
whether certain states’ rules are outside the scope of Concepcion). 
 91. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 92. In using the phrase “stands as an obstacle,” the Concepcion court referred back to Hines 
v. Davidowitz, whose only elaboration on the phrase is that “states cannot, inconsistently with the 
purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce 
additional or auxiliary regulations.”  Hines, 312 U.S. at 66–67. 
 93. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 651. 
 94. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 95. David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 454 (2011) (explaining 
that in Perry v. Thomas, the Supreme Court “described the FAA as a kind of equal protection 
clause that bar[s] state courts from applying contract principles in a manner that discriminate[s] 
against arbitration”). 
 96. In one of the first cases to interpret Concepcion, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the 
“Supreme Court concluded that the triggering conditions of California’s Discover Bank rule 
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If judicial challenges to class action waivers fail post-Concepcion, there 
remains some possibility of legislative action.97  For example, Congress could 
declare that class action waivers are simply unenforceable—at least in 
standard-form consumer and employment contracts.  This is the general idea 
behind two proposed bills—the Arbitration Fairness Act of 201198 and the 
Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 201199—though neither seems likely to 
pass.100 
Some hope also lies with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”).  The CFBP was created by the Dodd-Frank Act as an independent 
bureau within the Federal Reserve, designed to protect consumers in their 
transactions with banks, credit card companies, mortgage brokers, and other 
financial institutions.101  Section 1028 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the 
CFPB to conduct a study of and submit a report to Congress on the use of 
arbitration in consumer transactions, and “prohibit or impose conditions or 
limitations on the use of . . . arbitration of any future dispute between the 
parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions 
or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.”102  
 
imposed no effective limit on its application” and it “implied that although the Discover Bank 
rule was cast as an application of unconscionability doctrine, in effect, it set forth a state policy 
placing bilateral arbitration categorically off-limits for certain categories of consumer fraud cases, 
upon the mere ex post demand by any consumer.”  Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 
1205, 1211 (11th Cir. 2011).  For this reason, the Eleventh Circuit recognized, the “Court then 
held that . . . this state-imposed policy preference ‘interferes with fundamental attributes of 
arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.’”  Id. 
 97. See, e.g., RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 320 (describing pre-AT&T legislative 
proposals to make class action waivers “unenforceable for consumers, or for employees bringing 
civil rights claims” as well as “a few targeted statutes [that] have been enacted to limit their 
applicability”). 
 98. S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 99. S. 1652, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).  This bill would legislatively overturn Concepcion for 
all cell phone contracts, so that “a predispute arbitration agreement between a covered individual 
and a provider of mobile service shall not be valid or enforceable.” 
 100. See Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A26 (noting that the 
chances of the Arbitration Fairness Act passing to override Concepcion “aren’t great in the 
current political environment”); David Lazarus, Lawmakers Should Ensure Consumers Have the 
Right to Sue, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2012, at B1 (reporting that the Arbitration Fairness Act “bill 
hasn’t gone anywhere since it was unveiled in May [because] [i]ts corporate opponents, including 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, have lobbied against it”); David Lazarus, Aiming to Restore Our 
Right to Sue, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at B1 (noting that industry lobbyists oppose both bills). 
 101. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
1011, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (Supp. 2011). 
 102. Dodd-Frank Act § 1028(b); 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b).  Notably, Dodd-Frank confers similar 
authority on the SEC to ban mandatory arbitration in the securities context and flatly prohibits 
mandatory arbitration in mortgage and home equity loan contracts.  Dodd-Frank Act § 1414(e).  
The Act also bans mandatory arbitration that would waive protections for those who blow the 
whistle on securities fraud and commodities fraud.  Id. §§ 748, 922. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1220 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1203 
It is therefore possible that, after conducting its study of arbitration provisions 
in consumer contracts, the CFPB might someday issue regulations prohibiting 
class action waivers in those contracts over which it has direct authority.103 
But as of this writing, the CFPB remains steeped in controversy, as 
congressional Republicans have vowed to “defund, delay and defang” the 
nascent agency.104  Finally, after a nearly two-year stalemate, President Obama 
in January 2012 made a recess appointment of Richard Cordray to direct the 
CFPB.105  But even if the CFPB miraculously survives the current political 
battle, conducts the arbitration study, and concludes that banning class action 
waivers in these contracts is “in the public interest and for the protection of 
consumers,”106 “any resulting rule will apply, under [Dodd-Frank’s] 
grandfather clause, only to contracts entered into more than 180 days after that 
rule is issued.”107  This would severely limit the effectiveness of any 
regulations the agency might promulgate. 
In sum, judicial, legislative, and regulatory responses to Concepcion 
promise little; none appear imminent, likely, or complete.  Meanwhile, class 
waivers are being inserted into hundreds of contracts by the minute.  This begs 
the obvious question: What is lost in a world without class actions? 
II.  WHAT IS LOST IN A WORLD WITHOUT CLASS ACTIONS? 
The outlook for aggregate litigation—perhaps all forms of litigation108—in 
the wake of Concepcion is bleak.  The Supreme Court’s opinion is sufficiently 
broad that potential judicial interventions are unlikely or will operate in the 
exception rather than the main; and legislative or regulatory fixes appear 
infeasible in the current political climate.  Taken together, this means that most 
class cases will not survive the impending onslaught of class action waivers.  A 
fundamental question therefore arises: What is really lost in upholding class 
action waivers?  If private class actions are on the decline, are there other 
means by which claimants can seek to have their cases heard and injuries 
 
 103. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 656 & n.120 (considering the 
“enumerated consumer laws” within the CFPB’s jurisdiction). 
 104. Id. at 655. 
 105. E.g., Jim Puzzanghera & Lisa Mascaro, Obama Bypassing Senate to Appoint Richard 
Cordray Consumer Chief, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-
fi-obama-cordray-20120104,0,2612330.story. 
 106. Dodd-Frank Act § 1028(b). 
 107. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 658 (citing Dodd-Frank Act § 
1028(d)). 
 108. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4, at 80 (asserting that the Court’s rulings in 
Concepcion and Wal-mart “make plain that the constitutional concept of courts as a basic public 
service provided by government is under siege”). 
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compensated, and alternative forms of deterrence to influence a defendant’s 
behavior?109 
A. Doing Away With the “Private Attorney General” 
One possible response to the demise of private class actions is greater 
reliance on public regulatory agencies to adjudicate claims.  This vision of a 
robust public-agency-centered-rights regime would have the SEC, DOJ, EPA, 
FTC, EEOC, and their state counterparts bringing all manner of securities, 
antitrust, environmental, consumer, and employment litigation on behalf of 
injured citizens.  This, of course, is at least theoretically possible; Professor 
Resnik has chronicled a similar phenomenon in discussing the steady 
migration of adjudicatory functions from courts to administrative agencies,110 
with the concomitant increase in administrative personnel.111  For Professor 
Resnik, one suspects that such a model—where public authorities are vested 
with the exclusive authority to enforce broad public rights—would be 
problematic to the extent that it “removes conflict resolution from public 
purview,” and therefore fails to capture the benefits of a public, open 
adjudicatory ideal.112 
But whatever its merits, a massive shift to a public enforcement regime is 
completely impractical and antithetical to contemporary socio-political norms.  
Private involvement in public civil law enforcement is deeply embedded in our 
politics and culture.  Indeed, our entire civil justice system is constructed 
around the essential idea that private actors will be the “frontline enforcers in 
actions redressing broadscale securities fraud, consumer fraud and deceptive 
trade practices, antitrust violations (outside of the merger context), civil rights 
violations and many other areas.”113  State and local enforcement agencies in 
particular (and many federal ones, too114) are funded and organized on the 
 
 109. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 306 (“[D]elegating adjudication to other 
government institutions, and outsourcing [] represent a movement toward privatization that 
removes conflict resolution from public purview.”). 
 110. Id. at 314–15 (chronicling the creation and evolution of the Court of Claims to the Court 
of Federal Claims in the twentieth century, and describing other specialized “agency-based 
courts” created by Congressional legislation). 
 111. Id. at 315 (“[In 2001,] more than 4,700 administrative judges or hearing officers . . . 
work in federal agencies deciding specific kinds of claims, such as those brought by social 
security recipients, veterans, immigrants or federal employees. . . .  During the same era, more 
than 10,000 administrative law judges were based in state and local agencies.”). 
 112. Id. at 306; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 113. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 625–26; see also Resnik, Fairness in 
Numbers, supra note 4, at 112 (“The ability to use courts turns in large measure on the private 
bar, a smattering of public legal aid programs, third-party insurance companies, and chronically 
underfunded agencies.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and 
Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 126–27 (2005) (“Because the SEC lacks 
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clear, if largely unspoken, understanding that a vigorous and well-stocked 
private bar sits ready to deploy its ample resources to redress frauds and other 
harms perpetrated upon the general public.115  So while “[o]ne can imagine a 
world where public agencies assume primary (or even sole) responsibility for 
the detection, investigation, and litigation of public frauds, as well as the 
collection of ill-gotten gains and the distribution of compensation to injured 
persons . . . one would be imagining a very different world—one that provides 
orders of magnitude more resources to state and local enforcement 
agencies.”116 
B. Is Arbitration the New Adjudication? 
Could it be that, post-Concepcion, nothing changes and nothing is lost in 
moving from litigation to arbitration—that claims can and will be arbitrated 
and resolved within the arbitral forum as they would be in court?  This is a 
view one often hears from corporate defendants:117 it presumes the arbitral 
forum to be sufficient and equivalent to public-court adjudication and takes 
seriously the Supreme Court’s apparent judgment that “bilateral” or individual 
arbitration is preferable to adjudication.118  Indeed, proponents of ADR have 
long asserted that arbitration is superior to litigation, focusing “on 
adjudication’s failings—that it is too expensive, too cumbersome, and too 
aggressive.”119  Arbitration, on the other hand, is touted as “produc[ing] 
significant cost reductions while not altering outcomes.”120  On this view, 
arbitration offers “more than adjudication can—more access for claimants, less 
cost, and more congenial procedures.”121 
Professor Resnik has written extensively on this movement away from 
formal adjudication and towards arbitration, as more and more claims are 
 
adequate resources to effectively police the national securities market, supplemental enforcement 
is essential to achieve an appropriate level of deterrence.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer 
Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 663, 664 (2008) (“Recognizing the resource limitations of government agencies, many 
consumer laws provide a private right of action so individual consumers also can litigate 
violations of these laws.  Many of these laws also provide class actions and statutory damages 
which encourage consumers to act as ‘private attorneys general.’”). 
 116. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 626. 
 117. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 335 (“[T]he movement toward ADR is justified 
as offering more than adjudication can—more access for claimants, less cost, and more congenial 
procedures.”). 
 118. Resnik, Fairness, supra note 4, at 117–18 (tracing Supreme Court arbitration decisions). 
 119. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 309. 
 120. Id. at 313.  But see id. at 321 (“[S]upport for the proposition that contractual dispute 
resolution programs are better than adjudication—in terms of access, costs, speed, or outcomes—
is hard to come by.”). 
 121. Id. at 335. 
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being decided by private arbitral bodies.122  For Resnik, these developments 
(which she situates within a broader movement towards privatization of all 
sorts of heretofore governmental charges123) are perhaps a natural and expected 
result of the success of the adjudicatory model,124 as well as its failures.125  As 
more claimants have been vested with legal personhood and viable legal 
claims,126 the pressure put on courts has become intense and has led to multi-
dimensional efforts to shift adjudication elsewhere.127 
But, as Professor Resnik points out, shifting the work of the courts to other 
fora creates problems for the fair administration of justice, as “mini-codes of 
civil procedure are being created by . . . a multitude of private providers.”128  
Of particular concern to Resnik is the prospect of unequal bargaining power 
and the absence of decision-transparency—the due process and fairness 
implications of “Contract Procedure.”129  Open courts produce tremendous 
 
 122. Id. at 308; see also Resnik, Procedure, supra note 1, at 597 (“[F]ederal judges who once 
had declined to enforce ex ante agreements to arbitrate . . . now generally insist on holding parties 
to such bargains, thereby outsourcing an array of claims.”). 
 123. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 310 (“The outsourcing of what had been a public 
function is not a phenomenon unique to courts but rather part of a pervasive pattern in which 
various kinds of services (police, detention, school, and the military) have been shifted to the 
private sector.”); id. at 336 (describing Jody Freeman and Martha Minow’s work on 
“Government by Contract”). 
 124. See id. at 308 (describing the “very success of courts, attracting large numbers of 
claimants imposing demands that exceed capacity,” and the problems created when “governments 
have not allocated adequate funds—either for judges and courthouses or for subsidies to litigants 
unable to afford court and lawyer fees”); see also id. at 308–09 (describing legislative authority 
over judicial salaries resulting in too-low compensation levels for judges as compared to their 
counterparts in private practice); id. (describing states’ recessionary responses to justice, such as 
closing courthouses, limiting the availability of trials, and imposing increased court fees). 
 125. See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4 at 90 (“But not all celebrate the trajectory 
that identifies these due process obligations, producing more rights and more claimants knocking 
at courthouse doors.  The intersection of high demand curves for courts, the burdens of 
procedures, the costs of lawyers, and the regulatory successes achieved by some plaintiffs have 
prompted diverse critiques, styling the civil justice system as overburdened, overreaching, and 
overly adversarial.”). 
 126. Id. at 105–06 (“As women gained stature as equal persons, state and federal laws 
governing families burgeoned to deal with rights to divorce, child custody, and support.  
Moreover, both state and federal statutes authorized governments, individuals, and groups to 
bring claims and created both procedures and incentives to do so, such as the treble damage 
provisions of the antitrust laws, the 1966 class action rule, and the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act.”). 
 127. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 335 (“Outsourcing, devolution, subcontracting, and 
facilitating nonpublic resolutions are increasingly the norm, as courts and legislatures send work 
to agencies and to private dispute resolution centers.”). 
 128. Resnik, Procedure, supra note 1, at 597. 
 129. See id. at 598, 653.  Instead of asking, “How could fair decisions be achieved?  What 
kind and quantum of information sufficed to render binding judgments that had law’s force 
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amounts of information about case proceedings and outcomes; “[i]n contrast, 
private dispute resolvers are left to do as they wish,” with little obligation to 
“make available to the public information about parties, categories of disputes, 
time to disposition, and outcomes.”130  If a vital function that courts serve in 
our democracy is to provide citizens a lens into the way law operates, private 
arbitration is formally designed to provide no such window: “third parties can 
neither attend nor inspect records (if made) of proceedings, opinions are not 
published, and parties may be subject to admonitions of confidentiality.”131  
The information-suppressing effects of arbitration were once upon a time 
considered problematic by the Supreme Court;132 but that view lost favor in the 
late-1980s.133 
Yet these concerns no longer seem as significant in the aftermath of 
Concepcion: class actions are not being “outsourced” to the private arbitral 
forum because the class action waiver effectively bars these claims from being 
brought in any forum.134  Despite how “quick [and] easy” AT&T’s arbitration 
process in the Concepcion case may have been, “few consumers invoked [that] 
process”135—and one wonders if any did.  Certainly, individual arbitrations of 
consumer claims will have a difficult time attracting lawyers, who will find 
little profit in representing a handful of small-claims clients.136  As Justice 
Breyer asked in his Concepcion dissent, “What rational lawyer would have 
 
behind them?  How much process was due?,” id. at 596, our system now asks “when an 
enforceable settlement has been achieved, who has the power to bind whom, whether courts 
should refuse certain of the bargains struck, and which court has jurisdiction to enforce 
settlements when disputes arise.”  Id. at 597.  Another set of concerns raised by the move away 
from adjudication and towards arbitration was the state’s own involvement in validating the 
“social and political attitudes [that are] less hospitable to government oversight.”  Id. at 623. 
 130. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4, at 108. 
 131. Id. at 111. 
 132. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–36 (1953) (finding it problematic that 
arbitrators’ awards “may be made without explanation of [arbitrators’] reasons and without a 
complete record of their proceedings,” such that no understanding could be had of the 
“arbitrators’ conception of the legal meaning” of fundamental doctrinal norms), overruled by 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); see also Judith Resnik, 
Many Doors? Closed Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 211, 223–24 (1995). 
 133. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484 (overruling Wilko). 
 134. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 336; Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 
38, at 675. 
 135. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4, at 111 (internal quotations omitted). 
 136. See Christopher M. Mason & Benjamin R. Dwyer, Class Action Alert, NIXON PEABODY 
LLP, 2, 4 (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/Class_ 
Action_Alert_04_27_2011.pdf [hereinafter Class Action Alert] (advising companies to “consider 
tailoring their contracts to provide the individual customer reasonable access to a fair and 
inexpensive dispute resolution process like the contract addressed in Concepcion”); see also infra 
note 137. 
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signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees 
stemming from a $30.22 claim?”137 
Moreover, as corporate defendants craft ever more generous and 
consumer-friendly arbitration clauses—as we should expect they will so as to 
pass legal muster138—courts faced with these provisions will be hard-pressed 
to find them insufficient or wanting.  In Concepcion, for example, one of the 
reasons AT&T’s arbitration clause was viewed so favorably by the Court was 
that it provided that claimants were entitled to a $7500 cash award if they 
received an arbitration award superior to the defendant’s final pre-award 
offer.139  One post-Concepcion decision has already enforced a similar 
arbitration clause, which provided that “if the arbitrator awards [plaintiff] more 
than [defendant’s] last settlement offer, plaintiffs are entitled to double 
attorney’s fees.”140 
Resnik’s concern with the contractualization of procedure and the 
attendant due process implications of mini-codes141 has been eclipsed by a 
grim reality that—at least for aggregate litigation—procedure is no more.  
Under current law, class action waivers cut off all viable means of bringing 
legal claims, silencing “the communicative possibilities provided through 
courts to record, as well as to struggle with, conflicts of meaning, rights, and 
facts.”142 
In sum, if neither a purely public, administrative, agency-based response, 
nor a purely private, individual, arbitration-based response are reasonably 
 
 137. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); see also Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (“Even if [plaintiff] were willing to incur approximately $200,000 to recover a few 
thousand dollars, she would be unable to retain an attorney to prosecute her individual claim. . . .  
[Plaintiff’s counsel] will not prosecute her individual claim without charge, and will not advance 
the required costs where the [defendant’s] [a]greement’s fee-shifting provisions present little 
possibility of being made whole.”); Picardi v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 251 P.3d 723, 725 
(Nev. 2011) (noting plaintiffs’ argument that “the class action waiver was exculpatory because, in 
cases . . . where the individualized claims are relatively small, it is almost impossible to secure 
legal representation unless those claims are aggregated with the claims of other similarly situated 
individuals”). 
 138. See Class Action Alert, supra note 136, at 4 (advising companies to “consider tailoring 
their contracts to provide the individual customer reasonable access to a fair and inexpensive 
dispute resolution process like the contract addressed in Concepcion”). 
 139. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745, 1753.  Indeed, the district court judge described 
AT&T’s arbitration provision as “perhaps the most fair and consumer-friendly provisions this 
Court has ever seen.”  Makarowski v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. CV 09-1590-GAF (CWx), 2009 
WL 1765661, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2009). 
 140. In re Apple and AT&T iPad Unlimited Data Plan Litig., No. C-10-02553 RMW, 2011 
WL 2886407, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2011) (order granting AT&T Mobility’s motion to compel 
arbitration and stay claims except as to plaintiff Hanna). 
 141. Resnik, Procedure, supra note 1, at 597. 
 142. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 336. 
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foreseeable in the wake of Concepcion, then group-based adjudication may 
soon vanish.  And as this great mass of consumer protection, antitrust, 
employment, and other cases is swept out to sea, the question arises: What or 
who can fill the resulting enforcement gap? 
III.  THE OFFICE OF THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL IS OPEN FOR BUSINESS 
Elsewhere, I have offered a specific prescription remedying for the 
enforcement gap created by Concepcion.143  Specifically, I have suggested that 
state attorneys general might step into the void left by private class action 
attorneys by exploiting their broad parens patriae authority.144  This 
prescription is both practical and strategic: suits brought under parens patriae 
are not subject to the strictures of Rule 23, as these are not technically class 
actions.145  Therefore, class action waivers ought not apply against the state 
attorney general.146 
But in addition to be being a functional response to Concepcion, the 
prospect of state AGs taking on a more robust enforcement role engages and 
interacts with Professor Resnik’s vision of adjudication.  If state AGs step up 
and assume responsibility for the cases that have traditionally been litigated by 
the private class action bar—and particularly if they come to engage private 
counsel to help identify and litigate those cases—should we (and would 
Professor Resnik) applaud or boo? 
On the one hand, for Professor Resnik, one of the main values of public 
adjudication of disputes is publicity—the “idea that the public, as an audience” 
can watch, participate, and therefore help produce the content and meaning of 
law.147  Indeed, for Resnik, “it is the performance of fairness before the public 
 
 143. See generally Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 658–75 (discussing the 
ability of the states’ attorneys general to bring suit under parens patriae authority on behalf of the 
citizens of their state as a potential remedy to the disappearing ability of citizens to bring class 
actions themselves). 
 144. Id. at 660–61. 
 145. Id. at 660. 
 146. But see id. at 664–65 (discussing the possibility that defendants could assert that parens 
patriae suits are barred under agency principles, wherein the agent-state attorney general is bound 
by the class action waivers agreed to by the principal-consumer; but arguing that agency 
principles are incompatible with the theory underlying parens patriae authority). 
 147. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4, at 87.  She continues: 
Fairness requires not only procedurally adequate hearings . . . but also participation from 
those outside a litigation triangle, invited to partake in interactive exchanges that produce, 
confirm, or reject legal rules.  That publicity enables assessments of whether procedures 
and decisionmakers are fair and permits an understanding of the impact of resources . . . .  
The presence of the public divests both the government and private litigants of control 
over the meanings of the claims made and the judgments rendered and enables popular 
debate about and means to seek revision of law’s content and application. 
Id. 
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that legitimates adjudication.”148  This concept of publicity lies at the center of 
her democratic theory of courts having a distinct role “in producing, 
redistributing, and curbing power.”149  Greater reliance on state AGs—acting 
through their own offices or hiring private lawyers to represent the state in 
parens patriae cases—has the potential to satisfy Professor Resnik’s insistence 
on publicity and public adjudication. 
In addition, Professor Resnik’s concerns with accessibility, voice, and 
equality150 are also potentially satisfied by an AG-centered model, as the 
state’s most prominent and most public law office is well-situated to receive, 
triage, and (as warranted) act upon complaints voiced by the citizenry.151  And 
the very fact that the claim itself will be heard in open court—that it will not be 
deep-sixed by a class action waiver—is a big plus, as is the accountability of 
the civil prosecutor to public democratic processes. 
But the claim that greater state AG involvement could result in greater 
democratic participation in litigation is complicated and indeterminate, 
presenting some daunting challenges.  To the extent that state AGs rely on 
private lawyers to bring claims on behalf of the state, there is the possibility of 
pay-to-play type corruption—or at the very least, a system that restricts access 
to justice to claims asserted by favored constituents of a centralized 
gatekeeper.152  Any such regime153 is flatly antithetical to the values that 
animate Professor Resnik’s scholarship.  While there are ways to regulate and 
proscribe the potential capture of public servants by private interests,154 finding 
the political will to utilize parens patriae authority to bring actions on behalf 
of injured citizens and to tap private lawyers to bring those actions where cash-
strapped AGs’ offices are unable will require tremendous resolve. 
In the end, the question here is not a normative one.  Whether the state AG 
model is a good thing depends, really, on how things play out.  It depends on 
 
 148. Id.; see also Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and 
Public Sphere(s), 5 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 4–5 (2011) (describing Bentham’s view that 
publicity enables the electorate to form independent judgments about the quality of government 
actions). 
 149. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at xv. 
 150. See supra notes 11, 15, 128–29 and accompanying text. 
 151. See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 660–64 (explaining the particular 
position of state AGs in terms of explicit authorization to redress wrongs on behalf of citizens, 
ability to circumvent Rule 23 requirements, and limited standing issues). 
 152. See generally id. at 670 (worrying that this “model courts ‘pay-to-play’ type abuses, 
where state officials extract benefits for bestowing lucrative engagements upon favored members 
of the private bar”). 
 153. Id. at 674 n.230 (citing examples of corrupt “pay-to-play” regimes). 
 154. See id. at 675 n.232 (describing the American Legislative Exchange Council’s 2008 
proposed model legislation entitled the Private Attorney Retention Sunshine Act, requiring “an 
open and competitive bidding process prior to the awarding of any state contract for legal 
services”). 
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people—the choices they make and how they behave.  We have to wait and 
see. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps Professor Resnik is right that due process procedure is merely “in 
eclipse, [but] is surely not dead.”155  But recent years have evidenced a 
significant and palpable shift away from the ideals that she reveres.  Access to 
courts has been limited by doctrines of federal preemption,156 sovereign 
immunity,157 heightened pleading requirements,158 limitations on attorneys’ 
fees,159 exhaustion of remedies requirements,160 and other innovations of a 
legal and political system that increasingly views “many kinds of private 
litigation as wrong-headed and wasteful.”161  This hostility has proven far more 
ferocious when directed against class action litigation, which has been under 
siege for decades. 
With the decision in Concepcion, the war against class actions seems 
nearly done, as opponents have won a string of important battles.162  These 
judicial and legislative decisions radically restrict the continued ability of 
private actors to vindicate public rights via the class action mechanism.  As the 
private attorney general model recedes, Professor Resnik’s vision of 
adjudication as a public good goes with it.  This vision—wherein adjudication 
serves democratic goals beyond the resolution of individual or aggregate 
claims163—values adjudication’s public dimensions, which “enable a diverse 
audience to see the effects of the application of law in many specific 
situations.”164  This is a vision of litigation as an “instrument[] of the public, of 
 
 155. Resnik, Procedure, supra note 1, at 624. 
 156. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008). 
 157. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (“The ultimate 
guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private 
individuals in federal court.”). 
 158. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (requiring a plaintiff to plead 
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 570 (2007) 
(requiring facts sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). 
 159. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2006). 
 160. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006). 
 161. Jean Maclean Snyder, Closing the Courthouse Door, LITIG., Fall 2008, at 43, 43. 
 162. See generally Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 626–27 & n.13, 658–59 
(detailing the increasingly heightened standards on class certification and standing). 
 163. See Resnik, Whither Adjudication?, supra note 32, at 1102; see also Judith Resnik, 
Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes 
Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 536–37 (2006). 
 164. Resnik, Whither Adjudication?, supra note 32, at 1102; see also Resnik, Failing Faith, 
supra note 33 at 553–54 (“[O]ne of the saving graces of adjudication is its ‘public dimension’—
the accountability and education which flow from its public, visible nature.”); Resnik, A Public 
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judges as guardians of the public, and of the public as having an interest in 
adjudication beyond its function of concluding disputes of the parties or across 
a series of disputes over time.”165  This is a vision on the decline, and without a 
strong and immediate response to decisions such as Concepcion that decline 
may be severe and permanent. 
  
 
Dimension, supra note 4, at 417 (“I believe that the norms are generated in the course of the 
interaction among disputants and adjudicator, and among disputants, adjudicator, and the public.  
This is an interaction over time, during which the polity develops, learns about, and changes the 
norms that govern disputes.”). 
 165. Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and 
the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1527 
(1994). 
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